INTRODUCTION
Integrated resource planning (IRP) helps utilities and state regulatory com missions assess consistently a variety of demand and supply resources to meet customer energy-service needs cost-effectively. Key characteristics of this planning paradigm include: {a) explicit consideration of energy-efficiency and Many other planning issues are important, but are not discussed in this paper. Such issues include alternative ways to organize planning within utilities; the role of collaboration and other forms of nonutility involvement in planning (6, 7) ; the relationships among competition, deregulation, and utility planning; treatment of electricity pricing as a resource; fuel switching (pri marily between electricity and gas); treatment of uncertainty in utility plan ning and decision making (8, 9) ; the appropriate economic tests for utility DSM programs; ways to measure the performance of DSM programs (10); development and use of improved data and planning models; and transfer of Several states adjust for DSM-induced revenue losses. These adjustments ensure that utilities collect from customers the net revenue that they would have gained from employing their generating resources had the DSM program not reduced electricity sales. A related option is to decouple utility profits from sales. Th.s approach is used in several states, most notably in California where the PUC uses an Electric Revenue Adjustment Mechanism (ERAM) and in New York where the Commission (13) approved a "Revenue Decou pling Method' for one utility. In both states, these regulatory mechanisms guarantee that utility earnings are independent of the amount of sales achieved. ERAM has been used in California since 1982 and accounts for the over-or under-collection of authorized base revenues (essentially all nonfuel costs) caused by discrepancies between actual and forecast sales of electricity (14) . Utilities use balancing accounts for over-(or under-) collection of revenues. These revenues are then returned to (or collected from) customers the following year through an adjustment to the price of electricity This mechanism breaks the link between sales and profits, thus eliminating a major disincentive to utility DSM programs.
PUCs in several states have also approved various types of financial incentives to utility shareholders for exemplary delivery of DSM services Uable 2) . In addition, investigations on incentive proposals are being con ducted by about 10 other PUCs (15) . These bonus incentives can be grouped into three broad groups: increased rate of return, bounty, and shared savings
The simplest approach is to adjust the utility's allowed rate of return for a specified accomplishment, such as achieving target levels of energy savings or DSM spending. The adjusted rate of return is applied either to the utility's DSM investment or to its total rate base. For example, Washington allows ut.ht.es to earn a 2% higher return on equity for conservation expending than for other investments.
example, the PUC in Massachusetts recently approved an incentive for Massachusetts Electric that provides "a fixed payment for each kW and kWh lt^thr°Ugh fthf provides a fixed pay lm'Wi« Tt^thr°Ugh a" after"the-fact eval^fon and monitoring 't h "T 3dVantage°f SUCh a method is its administrative icity. However, the ut.lity has no incentive to minimize DSM program '"115^"^dePe"d dit' * bfi pr°Vided by its Shared-savings mechanisms are probably the most popular approach Un der th.s approach the utility keeps a fraction (typically 10-20%) of the net benefit Prov.ded by its DSM programs. The net benefit is the difference between the total benefits and program costs. Total benefits are typical y defined as the amount of energy saved by the program multiplied by the York, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire ( Table 2 ). Figure 1 shows how such an incentive mechanism might work. The bars at the bottom of the figure show the relationships among total benefits, program costs, and the net benefit. The top part shows how the net benefit might be shared between utility shareholders and customers. In this example, shareholders earn an additional $3 million if the utility achieves its target net benefit of $20 million. If the utility's DSM programs are more effective than expected, earnings increase (but are typically capped at a prespecified upper limit). On the other hand, shareholders pay a penalty (i.e. earnings decrease) if the utility is unable to achieve 40% of the target. And shareholders receive no benefit if the net benefit falls in the "deadband" range of 40-60% of the target. This approach ensures that utility shareholders face both risk and reward.
Shared-savings incentives may not be appropriate for all types of DSM programs. Some DSM programs are offered primarily for equity reasons (e.g. direct assistance to low-income customers) and may not offer significant net resource savings (17) . Shared-savings incentives are best suited for DSM programs that provide least-cost resource options and involve installation of energy-efficient hardware as opposed to behavioral changes.
Incentives can affect a utility's overall planning process. For many utilities, DSM-program planning, design, and evaluation have not been especially important activities. With incentives, utility earnings depend in part on the savings from DSM programs. Thus, both utilities and PUCs are emphasizing evaluation because evaluations identify the energy and demand savings pro vided by DSM programs. The visibility of DSM programs is increased because they affect the utility's earnings (so top management wants to know the results of these programs). And regulators are requiring better measure ment of the actual benefits of DSM programs before utilities receive incentive payments. Thus, incentive mechanisms can help close the loop among DSMprogram planning, implementation, and evaluation.
In summary, providing incentives to utilities will not solve all the problems associated with planning and resource acquisition. But they can be a critical element of a successful IRP process by aligning the utility's financial interest with aggressive pursuit of a least-cost energy strategy.
Because states differ in ratemaking practices (e.g. historic vs future test years and fuel-adjustment clauses) and utilities differ in structure and corpo rate culture, it is unlikely that any one mechanism will be suitable every where. Figure 2 shows projected DSM expenditures and annual earnings from incentive mechanisms for five utilities. These DSM incentives differ in structure, size, and riskiness to the utility. Pacific Gas & Electric's incentive is quite attractive (37% of total DSM expenditures), but the company will not earn any incentive unless it exceeds minimum performance targets that are quite high. In contrast, Southern California Edison's incentive is lower (11% of total expenditures) but is structured so that the utility has a greater chance of earning additional money even if customer participation is lower than expected.
The size of bonuses for implementing exemplary DSM programs needs to be evaluated in the context of spending levels and resource value of these programs, the risk/reward relationship facing the utility, the impact on cus- tomer rates, and the impact on the utility's overall return on equity. Superior incentive mechanisms are likely to be state-and utility-specific and evolve out of negotiations among key parties. A variety of incentive mechanisms are being tested in many states and the effects of these schemes should be carefully evaluated. The credibility and future viability of incentive mech anisms hinges on the ability to measure energy savings and load reductions carefully and accurately (10), because these measurements determine the payments to utilities. Finally, development of incentive mechanisms is in one sense a large-scale experiment, one which is being implemented in an ad hoc fashion.
INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS IN UTILITY PLANNING
Electricity production imposes significant burdens on the environment. In the United States, roughly two-thirds of the SO2 emissions and one-third of the NOX emissions, both of which cause acid deposition with its accompanying harmful effects on trees, lakes, and man-made structures, come from power plants Electric utilities account for about one-third of US emissions of CO2, the principal greenhouse gas (18) . In addition, electricity production causes water pollution, solid waste, and land-use problems. These effects of electric-ity production and transmission are externalities, defined as any cost not reflected in the price paid by electricity consumers (19) . Existing federal and state regulations internalize some of the environmental costs associated with electricity production (e.g. regulations that limit emissions), and it is likely that this approach to managing environmental externalities will be expanded in the future. 4. The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (24) concluded that environmental externalities should be assigned monetary values using implied valuation methods (i.e. cost of control estimates as a proxy for environmental damages in the absence of comprehensive damage cost estimates) and specified externality values to be used by all utilities in resource planning and bidding processes ( Table 3 ). The adopted values for various emissions (in $/ton) are high and are likely to have a significant negative effect on various resource options (e.g. coal-fired technology).
Wisconsin and Vermont use a percentage adder that either increases the cost of supply resources or decreases the cost of DSM resources in utility planning. Differentiation among supply technologies is limited (e.g. coal vs gas-fired projects) and focuses on generic technical characterizations rather than individual projects. A more detailed evaluation of the environmental impacts of specific projects occurs in a separate regulatory process or is Options for Incorporating Environmental Externalities Table 4 lists the major approaches used to incorporate environmental ex ternalities in utility resource planning and selection, and in system operation. Initially, utilities will often characterize and describe environmental effects of various generation options without trying to value these impacts. Resource options are described in terms of their environmental attributes (e.g. emission types and rates, water and land use). This type of work is a useful starting point and typically forms the basis for a more detailed analysis of externali ties.
Ranking and weighting procedures estimate the attractiveness of resource options using relative environmental damages. Ranking and weighting schemes vary widely in sophistication as well as technical basis, and could rely heavily on subjective judgments, or conversely on a synthesis of informa tion drawn from a detailed characterization of environmental effects of re source options.
New England Electric Systems (NEES) developed a rating and weighting approach, which it uses in its long-range planning process and proposes to use in competitive bidding (25) . Based on a survey of experts, NEES assigns various weights to environmental factors: global climate change (11%), acid rain (15%), land use (10%), water use (16%), emissions to air (17%), ozone (18%), and other factors (15%). Actual emission rates are then multiplied by the environmental factor as well as a percentage weight (e.g. the 15% weight Table 4 Alternative approaches to incorporating environmental externalities possible for some environmental-resource damages, dose-response rela tionships are uncertain, valuing intangible costs (e.g. recreation facilities and endangered species of wildlife) is difficult, valuing human mortality is con troversial, and much of the direct-costing research is area-specific and may not be transferable to other regions (26) .
The second approach, called "implied valuation," relies on the cost of control (or mitigation) of the pollutants emitted by the generating technology to estimate the value of pollution reduction (19) . The rationale for this approach is that the cost of controls provides an estimate of the price that society is willing to pay to reduce the pollutant. This approach has several limitations (e.g. it cannot directly be applied to pollutants such as CO2 that are not now regulated), but its principal disadvantage is that pollution-control costs bear little relation to the actual damages imposed by power plant emissions. Nevertheless, PUCs that want to assign monetary values to ex ternalities often favor this approach (e.g. Massachusetts, New York, and California).
Approaches that rely on "set-asides" for specified technologies in resource selection processes have also been proposed by planning agencies in Califor nia. Regulators would specify the preferred mix of new generating resources to be acquired by the utility, which would best account for environmental externalities. For example, a utility might conduct two competitive resource procurements (one that would include all types of projects while the other would be restricted to non-fossil fuel-based projects); the size of each resource block would be determined by the regulatory process (27) . Pro ponents argue that this approach is a reasonable interim response given the uncertainties associated with assigning monetary values to externalities.
However, "set-aside" schemes are often criticized by classical economists who argue that predetermined capacity limits for specific technology types produce inefficient economic outcomes.
Limits on emission levels or targets for quantities of pollutants (e.g. lower and maintain CO2 emissions at 1985 levels) is another method that has been proposed. Proponents of the environmental constraint approach argue that it avoids the complexity of direct damage assessment methods, and allows environmental quality improvements to be traded off explicitly against in creased costs to the utility and its ratepayers (20) . This approach is a particu larly attractive way to address CO2 emissions because of the inadequacy of "implied valuation" techniques (i.e. it is now not possible to define a cost of abatement option for CO2) and the global consequences and uncertainties of greenhouse gases.
The previous approaches focus primarily on long-range resource planning and selection. Bernow et al (28) suggested that a utility's short-run op erational decisions should also reflect environmental externalities, principally because of the enormous levels of pollution produced at existing generation facilities. They proposed that utilities dispatch their power plants on the basis of "full cost" dispatch, which includes both direct costs (fuel and variable operation & maintenance) as well as environmental externality costs. This approach is quite controversial and, if adopted, could cause sharp increases in electricity prices.
Emerging Issues
Many utilities argue that it is inappropriate for PUCs to place significant additional costs that result from environmental externalities only on electric utility consumers, and not on consumers of other fuels. Thus, electric utilities and others are likely to raise questions about the role of PUCs in addressing environmental externalities versus the roles of federal and state government agencies directly responsible for environmental quality (e.g. the US Environ mental Protection Agency).
Increased attention to environmental concerns may provide an important impetus for public policy makers and PUCs to broaden the boundaries of IRP.
For example, PUCs may ask gas and electric utilities to compare the social costs and benefits of providing energy services (e.g. water heating or cook ing) using gas directly vs through gas-fired electric generation. Future public policy concerns about the environmental effects of energy technologies may force significant changes in the demands for electricity and gas. For example, the policies of local air quality boards that limit vehicle emissions (and, for example, encourage electric cars) or national legislation affecting greenhouse gas emissions could affect future electricity and gas uses.
NEW APPROACHES TO ACQUIRING ELECTRIC POWER RESOURCES
Nonutility power production has emerged as a major source of new generating capacity, principally because of the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA). Cogenerators and small power producers built nearly 15,000
MW of nonutility capacity during the 1980s, although there were significant regional variations in nonutility capacity additions. Under PURPA, PUCs are responsible for pricing arrangements under which electricity is purchased from Qualifying Facilities (QFs) at the utility's avoided cost. Avoided costs were determined administratively and some states, which sought to encourage QF suppliers, offered long-term contracts based on forecasts of avoided costs.
In several states, the response by private producers was much greater than expected, partly because avoided-cost forecasts turned out to be high given events in world oil and gas markets. Some utilities also claimed that the obligation-to-purchase provisions of PURPA and the open-ended nature of standard-offer contracts introduced substantial uncertainty about how much power would ultimately be developed. Thus, PURPA fundamentally altered the market position of private producers and stimulated the development of competitive forces in electricity generation. But PURPA was not an un qualified success, because the supplier response created major planning and operational problems for some utilities.
Many utilities and PUCs are using competitive resource procurements (CRPs) as one way to obtain supply and DSM resources. Since the first CRP was issued by Central Maine Power in 1984, utilities and PUCs in 27 states have adopted or are developing competitive bidding systems (29) . Thus far capacity offered by private producers has often been 5-15 times greater than the utility's requirements (see Figure 3 for results from the most active states) However, some utilities have found that a significant fraction of bids do not meet the requirements specified in the bid package and are therefore not considered seriously. For example, Central Maine Power received bids for more than 2300 MW of generating capacity in response to a 1989 solicitation: only about 1000 MW remained as realistic options after CMP's initial review of the bids. Coal and natural gas dominate the bids received and accepted by electric utilities (29) .
CRPs as of December 1989. Gas-and coal-fired projects dominate, account ing for about 70% of the winning projects, while various renewable resources provided about 20% of the capacity of the projects selected by utilities.
The popularity of competitive bidding is strongly linked to the failures of power plant construction during the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. massive cost overruns, significant disallowances, rate shocks) as well as problems associ ated with implementing PURPA. CRPs are attractive to private producers because the purchasing utility offers long-term contracts, which they need to get financing on attractive terms. For the utility, competitive acquisition allows it to ration contracts for nonutility resources in an efficient manner.
Moreover, these contracts usually transfer to private developers some of the risks associated with project siting and permitting, construction cost overruns, operating problems and outages, and environmental impacts. In addition, a competitive process can reduce the burden of estimating avoided cost by providing a market benchmark to determine value.
Despite its theoretical virtues, there are formidable practical problems involved with developing competitive procurement programs. Traditional utility planning requires trade-offs among financial, operating, and environ mental features of resource alternatives. Competitive bidding requires the utility to address these issues through arms-length contracting. To assess bids, a utility must account for and value the multiple attributes of projects. This unbundling and explicit valuation of attributes is a new phenomenon in resource planning. Typically, utility bidding systems differentiate projects on pricing terms, operating characteristics, project status and viability (e.g.
likelihood of successful development), and in some cases environmental impacts. Determining the economic value of these nonprice factors is prob ably the most difficult problem that utilities confront in designing bidding systems (30) .
Two design features are particularly critical for utilities as they develop CRPs: (a) the method used to assess or score proposals, specifically the extent to which the utility discloses assessment criteria and the weight assigned to each feature before bid preparation; and (b) incorporation of DSM options into bidding schemes.
Bid Evaluation Criteria
Utilities take two general approaches to the bid solicitation and evaluation process. In the first approach, the utility develops an explicit scoring system that clearly states the assessment criteria and weights for various features.
Bidders self-score their projects, assigning points in various categories (e.g.
price, level of development, dispatchability) based on project characteristics.
This self-scoring approach can be considered an "open" system and is used in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York.
A principal advantage of self-scoring systems is their transparency. Regula tors can easily audit the utility's project rankings and there should be little controversy over the utility's selection of the winning bids. Some PUCs favor self-scoring because it allows them to shape utility planning decisions early in the resource-acquisition process rather than through after-the-fact prudence review of contracts. However, some utilities are concerned that self-scoring denies them the flexibility needed to select the optimal mix of projects.
Another potential disadvantage of self-scoring systems is that they assume that projects can be evaluated independent of their interactions with other projects. When the utility's resource need is small compared to the existing system, the independence assumption is reasonable; however it becomes increasingly untenable for resource procurements that are large relative to the existing utility system.
In the second approach, utilities reveal bid evaluation and project selection criteria in qualitative terms only, providing only general guidance about its preferences (30) . Bidders submit detailed proposals, which provide the basis for the utility's evaluation and ranking of projects. In this approach, the utility retains more discretion to select the optimal mix of projects as well as flexibility to negotiate with bidders in light of all offers received. This approach can be considered "closed" because the utility has information about the evaluation process that is not available to bidders. Prominent examples of this approach include procurements issued by Virginia Power, Florida Power and Light, and Public Service of Indiana.
The closed approach acknowledges the inherent complexity in optimizing resource selection because the value of proposed projects is multidimensional and uncertain, particularly over long times. Theoretically, this approach allows the utility to select the most efficient mix of bids, because it explicitly recognizes the interactive effects among individual projects and their effects on the utility system. In one sense, closed systems reflect the fact that the private power market is highly competitive and currently a buyer's market.
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Because private suppliers are abundant, utilities prefer not to provide prespecified bid evaluation criteria and their associated weights to bidders, but rather disclose only broad planning objectives (31).
Some utilities have experimented with hybrid approaches that combine elements of self-scoring and closed systems. For example, Central Maine Power includes elements of self-scoring, although the utility retains sub stantial flexibility to select attractive projects for further negotiation. Niagara Mohawk uses a self-scoring system for initial screening and then negotiates with bidders in the initial award group. The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (24) recently proposed a similar approach. This hybrid approach represents an attractive option that could successfully balance the utility's need for flexibility and discretion with the need to ensure fairness. Bid evaluation methods are an evolving art rather than a science and we expect continued experimentation with information requirements and risksharing between utilities and private power producers.
Bidding for DSM Resources
Another key issue that arises in CRPs is the types of resources and entities to include [e.g. QFs, independently owned generation facilities, energy service companies (ESCOs), large commercial and industrial customers, as well as the sponsoring utility]. Among these entities and resource options, the appropriateness of including "saved kWh and kW" provided by ESCOs or individual customers has been the subject of vigorous debate (32) (33) (34) (35) . Much of this debate has focused on theoretical issues related to integrating DSM and supply resources in the same "all-source" bidding process and the proper pricing of demand-side resources (36) .
Including demand-side options in a utility's bidding solicitation raises interesting design and implementation issues (37) . These include ways to measure the expected energy and demand savings and whether the ceiling price for DSM bids should be based on avoided cost or on the difference between avoided cost and average revenues (to reflect lost revenues). Some of these issues are not unique to DSM bidding and arise in utility DSM programs also. Determining the relationship between utility-sponsored DSM programs and DSM bidding efforts is likely to be a critical issue in the future because an increasing number of state PUCs are encouraging utilities to develop com prehensive DSM programs, stimulated by the offer of financial incentives for utility shareholders (38) . Table 6 summarizes results from utilities that include DSM options in their bidding approach, including the MW offered by bidders as well as the MW selected by the utility. In addition, results are shown for recent supply-side procurements conducted by New England Electric and Boston Edison, along with results from their DSM performance contracting programs involving Table 6 In summary, experience with bidding for DSM resources is limited. Initial experience suggests that DSM bidding may have a small role in a utility's overall DSM strategy but may not be appropriate for all market segments. For example, it is difficult to imagine DSM bids for the new construction market. The relative immaturity of the ESCO industry is in marked contrast with the strength of private power producers. In practice, this means that the quantities offered under DSM bidding programs will be small, and will not reflect the full market potential of DSM. Most utilities are skeptical about DSM bidding and prefer other ways to deliver DSM programs.
Future Prospects
Because of increased load growth and retirement of existing units, US electric utilities will need about 100,000 MW of new generating capacity during the next 10-15 years. Utilities and their regulators must decide on the proportions of utility-owned and nonutility-owned generation. The expectation that the private power market will supply a significant fraction of new capacity hinges on the success of competitive resource procurement processes. Success will be measured by the extent to which winning bidders develop working proj ects, continued benefits to ratepayers from competition (e.g. lower costs of power with adequate reliability), willingness of private suppliers to offer operational flexibility, and the perceived fairness of the process to all parties (e.g. the extent to which utilities refrain from potential abuse of market power by giving preference to unregulated subsidiaries or affiliates).
TREATING DSM PROGRAMS AS RESOURCES Program Potential and Performance
A recent study estimates that, as of 1990, utility DSM programs cut annual electricity use and peak demand by 1% and 4%, respectively (39) . The study's business-as-usual forecast of the effects of such programs shows reductions in annual electricity use of 3% in 2000 and 6% in 2010 and reductions in peak demand of 7% and 10%. Oak Ridge National Laboratory conducted a survey of 24 utilities to determine the present and likely future effects of their DSM programs. These utilities account for one-third of US electricity sales. Results showed a planned contribution of DSM programs to incremental energy resources (from 1990 to 2000) of 16% and a contribution to incremental capacity resources of 28% (40) . These numbers show that DSM programs are likely to account for an increasing share of total electricutility energy and capacity resources.
Neither of these estimates takes into account the likely increases in such programs because of (a) growing public concern about environmental quality; (b) a combination of pressure and the promise of financial incentives from state regulatory commissions; and (c) the increasing difficulties associated with the siting, licensing, and construction of new power plants and transmis sion lines.
In part, the effects of utility DSM programs are likely to increase because the potential for cost-effective savings remains large (41) . Both the ambitious estimates from the Rocky Mountain Institute and the cautious estimates from the Electric Power Research Institute, presented in Figure 5 , show large opportunities to reduce electricity consumption. For example, the Electric Power Research Institute analysis shows that it is technically feasible to cut electricity use by 24 to 44% by the year 2000 in addition to the 9% already included in utility forecasts. Similar studies have been conducted at the state or regional level for the Pacific Northwest, California, Michigan, and New York. The New York study, for example, identified cost-effective efficiency improvements amounting to one-third of 1986 use (42) . 
DSM Uncertainties
Uncertainties associated with DSM programs fall into two classes, neither of which has been adequately incorporated into utility resource planning. The small unit sizes and short lead times of DSM programs reduce the uncertain- In addition to these uncertainty-reduction benefits, DSM programs create new uncertainties for utilities. These uncertainties concern likely future participation in programs and their associated energy and demand savings. New England Electric (47) conducted probabilistic assessments of all the resources, both supply and demand, in its integrated resource plan. Experts from different parts of the company assessed the likelihood that different projects would achieve their planned outputs at different times in the future. The purpose of this analysis was "to provide an estimate of how certain [New England Electric System] can be that a given resource plan will meet future needs " This analysis showed that the company's DSM programs had an 80% chance of reducing peak demand by at least 400 MW in 1995 and a 50% probability of cutting demand by at least 580 MW that year.
Finally, utilities in New England, New York, Wisconsin, California, and the Pacific Northwest are rapidly expanding their DSM programs, with budgets expected to double or triple within a few years. These utilities are counting on DSM programs to defer construction of new power plants to a much greater extent than was true in the past. Uncertainties exist about the availability of skilled people to plan, design, and implement these programs and the materials and high-efficiency equipment these programs promote.
Information Needs
From the perspective of resource planning (rather than program design and implementation), the greatest need is for additional data on the costs and performance of DSM programs. Utilities need data in three areas: baseline data on the efficiency and utilization patterns of end-use systems in the existing stock of equipment, buildings, and factories; data on the costs and performance of energy-efficiency and load-management technologies; and data on customer participation in and costs of different types of utility DSM programs.
Much baseline data exists on some customer groups, building types, and end-uses, especially for the residential sector. Information is most limited for the industrial sector, especially related to process uses. Data on the perform ance of individual technologies is abundant, but widely scattered and often collected in inconsistent ways.
However, the information on actual DSM programs (the third of the three topics) is especially limited and crucial. Additional information is needed on program participation, energy savings, and costs. For example, program participation, the ratio of the number of participants to the number of eligible customers, is defined in various ways. Ambiguities arise over annual vs cumulative rates, consistent definitions of participants and nonparticipants, and differences among retrofit, replacement, and new-construction markets.
DSM-program costs sometimes include customer costs and sometimes do not. Sometimes costs refer only to the direct costs of the devices and their installation. Other times, costs include the administrative activities (e.g. staff training, marketing, quality control, program evaluation, and corporate over head) as well as direct costs.
Utilities usually base their estimates of program energy savings primarily on engineering analysis rather than on field measurements of actual electricity use. Substantial evidence shows that such engineering calculations typically yield estimates of electricity savings higher than actually achieved.
Field measurements can include monthly electricity bills, special shortterm (e.g. 30-days) metering of circuits in a facility affected by a DSM program, time-of-use load-research data, or end-use load-research data. These data can be used to compute total electricity savings and net savings. Total savings is the reduction in electricity use experienced by customers that participate in a program. Net savings is the portion of total savings that can be directly attributed to the program. Thus, net savings is the difference between total savings and the savings that participants would have achieved on their own had the utility program not existed.
A few organizations have, in recent years, developed reporting formats and definitions for utility DSM programs. The data collection instrument de-veloped by the Northeast Region Demand-Side Management Data Exchange (48) is probably the most comprehensive.
Additional work is needed if, as seems likely, the role of utility DSM programs will continue to grow. Agreement must be reached on the appropri ate cost-effectiveness test(s) to use in assessing the benefits and costs of DSM programs. And utilities and PUCs need more information on the actual costs and energy savings of DSM programs. Such field data will reduce the perception on the part of some utilities that DSM programs are "risky" because they depend on the (often unseen) actions of millions of customers.
GUIDELINES FOR PREPARATION OF UTILITY PLANS
Many electric utilities periodically prepare long-term resource plans, often in response to requirements from their PUC. These plans inform regulators and customers about the utility's analysis of alternative ways to meet future energy-service needs and the utility's preferred mix of resources to meet those needs. The plan is an opportunity for the utility to share its vision of the future with the public and to explain its plan to implement this vision.
In principle, utility plans should be assessed on the basis of the utility's resource-acquisition activities. But IRP is so new that insufficient im plementation has as yet resulted from these plans. Currently, utility plans can be assessed only on the basis of their planning reports. This section discusses guidelines for long-term resource plans, based on the written reports (7, 49) .
The purpose of these guidelines is to help PUC staff who review utility plans and utility staff who prepare such plans. Several utility plans contain many of the positive features in the guidelines (45, (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) .
The "goodness" of a plan can be judged by at least four criteria (Table 8): 1. The clarity with which the contents of the plan, the procedures used to produce it, and the expected outcomes are presented; 2. The technical competence (including the computer models and supporting data and analysis) with which the plan was produced; 3. The adequacy and detail of the short-term action plan; and 4. The extent to which the interests of various stakeholders are addressed.
Report Clarity
The primary purpose of a utility's IRP report is to help utility executives decide (and PUC commissioners review) which resources to acquire, in what amounts, and when. Thus, the report must be useful both within and outside the utility. The utility's plan should be well-written and appropriately illus- Table 8 Checklist for a good integrated resource plan (49) Clarity of plan-adequately inform various groups about future electricity resource needs, resource alternatives, and the utility's preferred strategy Typically, computer models are used for a variety of functions in developing a plan, such as load-forecasting; screening, selection, and analysis of demand and supply resources; and calculations of production costs, revenue require ments, electricity prices, and financial parameters. These models are used to analyze a wide range of plausible futures and available resources in develop ing the utility's preferred resource portfolio. The basic structure of the models used, the assumptions upon which they are based, and the inputs utilized should be explained.
The technical competence of a utility's IRP is reflected most critically in the ways that the demand and supply resources are presented as an integrated package. The analytical process used to integrate these different resources should be discussed. The criteria used to assess different combinations of resources (e.g. revenue requirements, annual capital costs, average prices, reserve margin, and emissions of pollutants) should be clearly stated.
Results for different combinations of supply and demand resources should be shown explicitly. It is not enough to treat demand as a subtraction from the load forecast and then do subsequent analysis with supply options only. Subtracting DSM-program effects from the forecast and using the resultant "net" forecast for resource planning eliminates DSM programs from all integrating analysis. This approach makes it difficult to assess alternative combinations of DSM programs and supply resources and the uncertainties, risks, and risk-reduction benefits of DSM programs (e.g. small unit size and short lead time).
Demand-side resources must be treated in a fashion that is both substantively and analytically consistent with the treatment of supply resources; demand and supply resources must compete head to head. The plan must show how the process truly integrates key parts of the company: load forecast ing, DSM resources, supply resources, finances, rates. And the important feedbacks among these components (especially between rates and future loads) should be shown.
A thorough analysis of a variety of plausible future conditions and the options available to deal with them is essential. This analysis should consider uncertainties about the external environment (e.g. economic growth and fossil-fuel prices) and about the costs and performance of different resources.
The analysis should show how utility decisions are affected by different assumptions about these factors and show the effects of these uncertainties and decisions on customer and utility costs. The assumptions must be varied in ways that are internally consistent and plausible. Differences among re sources in unit size, construction time, capital cost, and operating perfor mance should be considered for how they affect the uncertainties faced by utilities. Finally, the links between the results of these multiple runs and the utility's resource-acquisition decisions must be demonstrated.
Action Plan
The action plan, in many ways the "bottom line" of the utility's plan, must be consistent with the long-term resource plan. This is necessary to ensure that what is presented as appropriate for the long haul is implemented, and implemented in an efficient manner. The action plan also should be specific and detailed. The reader should be able to judge the utility's commitment to different actions from this short-term plan. Specific tasks should be identified for the next two to three years, along with milestones and budgets. For example, the action plan should show the number of expected participants and the expected reductions in annual energy use, summer peak, and winter peak for each DSM program. The action plan also should discuss the data and analysis activities, such as model development, data collection, and updated resource assessments, needed to prepare for the next integrated resource plan.
Equity
A final criterion by which a plan can be judged is the effect of its recom mended actions on various interested parties. Because the interests of stakeholders differ, the ways in which they will be affected by short-and long-term costs, power availability, and other results of utility actions will likewise differ.
Without the involvement of customers and various interest groups a plan may ignore community needs. Accordingly, the plan should show that the utility sought ideas and advice from its customers and others in developing the plan. Energy experts from a state university, state energy office, PUC, environmental groups, and organizations representing industrial customers could be consulted as the plan is being developed. For example, utilities in New England are working closely with the Conservation Law Foundation to design, implement, and evaluate DSM programs (6).
Additional work is needed to refine the guidelines discussed here and to ensure that they are helpful to utilities and PUCs. In particular, PUCs should articulate better the reasons they want utilities to prepare such plans and how they will use the plans in their deliberations. This articulation should avoid the "data list or cookbook approach" and focus on the purposes of the planning report. In the long-run, the success of IRP should not be measured by assessing utility reports. Rather, the level and stability of energy-service costs, the degree of environmental protection, and the extent to which con sensus is achieved on utility resource acquisitions will be the important criteria.
FEDERAL ROLES TO PROMOTE INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING
Because electricity production consumes almost 40% of the primary energy used in the United States, electricity must be a major part of national energy policy. In addition, public concerns about environmental quality, economic productivity, and national security suggest a larger role for the federal govern The Western Area Power Administration (58), the second largest PMA, runs a small Conservation and Renewable Energy Program for its 800 utili ties. Western's service area encompasses 15 western states, a region of the country which, except for California, has little integrated resource planning and few DSM programs. As a consequence, Western's program could have large "technology transfer" effects throughout the region. Western's current program emphasizes flexibility for its customer utilities, primarily because these utilities differ substantially in size, mix of customers, dependence on other producers for their electricity supplies, and load/resource balance. Because of this diversity, Western imposes few requirements on its customers, operates a decentralized program from its five regional offices, and offers extensive technical assistance. Depending on the size and type of utility, it is required to conduct from one to five "activities," chosen from a list of approved projects developed by Western.
The major price paid for the program's simplicity and flexibility is the lack of justification for utility selection of conservation projects. Because Western requires no cost-effectiveness analysis, it is not clear whether or how in dividual DSM programs fit into any overall resource plan. In addition, there is little documentation of program benefits and costs in the present system. Fortunately, Western (59) is revising the program, with a final rule ex pected to be issued in mid-1991. Western could set aside a fraction of its low-cost federal hydropower for assignment to those utilities that run es pecially effective conservation programs. Access to additional low-cost pow er would be a very effective way to encourage utilities to pursue aggressively cost-effective DSM programs. Alternatively, Western could purchase energy savings and load reductions achieved by its customer utilities.
New federal legislation could require the federal power authorities to expand their DSM programs and to consider explicitly environmental and social factors in their benefit/cost analyses of all resource alternatives. Such legislation would be a logical extension of the 1980 Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act (P.L. 96-501), which explicitly made conservation the electricity resource of choice. Even without new legislation, the PMAs could expand their DSM programs, as the Western and Southwest ern Power Administrations already are.
CONCLUSIONS
A growing share (now almost 40%) of the primary energy consumed in the United States flows through electric utilities. Therefore, the economic and environmental effects of utility actions are enormous. Integrated resource planning is a new way for utilities to meet the energy-service needs of their customers and is widely used by utilities and PUCs along the east and west coasts and in the upper midwest. In this review, we discussed guidelines for preparation and review of IRP plans based on the approaches used by the most advanced utilities and commissions and highlighted the key issues associated with use of DSM programs as resources. We also examined three topics that are particularly important as utilities move from a period of excess capacity to one of resource need: new approaches (i.e. competitive procurements) for acquiring energy and capacity resources, ways to include environmental costs in resource planning and acquisition, and regulatory changes to overcome disincentives to utility DSM programs. Utilities and PUCs that successfully address these issues will be well positioned to acquire substantial amounts of cost-effective DSM resources and to harness the private-power market. These utilities and their customers will benefit from reasonably priced electricenergy services produced in an environmentally benign fashion. Because IRP is a comprehensive and open process, its implementation is likely to result in fewer controversies over utility resource-acquisition decisions.
Much work is needed to convert the potential benefits of IRP into reality.
Perhaps the greatest need is to transfer information, ideas, and enthusiasm from those utilities and PUCs active in IRP to those less active. It is also important to push the frontiers of resource planning in all the topics discussed here.
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